tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post4068587990128316751..comments2024-01-21T03:52:28.302-06:00Comments on The Great Ideas from The Great Books: What in your view . . .Max Weismannhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02461338802201367403noreply@blogger.comBlogger53125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-50507958875772397932010-07-23T07:16:13.359-05:002010-07-23T07:16:13.359-05:00An excerpt from Plato's dialogue "Meno&qu...An excerpt from Plato's dialogue "Meno".<br /><br />-----------------------<br /><br />[Soc.] Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?<br /><br />[Meno] I think not.<br /><br />[Soc.] There are some who desire evil?<br /><br />[Meno] Yes.<br /><br />[Soc.] Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?<br /><br />[Meno] Both, I think.<br /><br />[Soc.] And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be evils and desires them notwithstanding?<br /><br />[Meno] Certainly I do.<br /><br />[Soc.] And desire is of possession?<br /><br />[Meno] Yes, of possession.<br /><br />[Soc.] And does he think that the evils will do good to him who possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm?<br /><br />[Meno] There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and others who know that they will do them harm.<br /><br />[Soc.] And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them good know that they are evils?<br /><br />[Meno] Certainly not.<br /><br />[Soc.] Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature do not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods although they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be good they really desire goods?<br /><br />[Meno] Yes, in that case.<br /><br />[Soc.] Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be hurt by them?<br /><br />[Meno] They must know it.<br /><br />[Soc.] And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?<br /><br />[Meno] How can it be otherwise?<br /><br />[Soc.] But are not the miserable ill-fated?<br /><br />[Meno] Yes, indeed.<br /><br />[Soc.] And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated?<br /><br />[Meno] I should say not, Socrates.<br /><br />[Soc.] But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and possession of evil?<br /><br />[Meno] That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody desires evil.<br /><br />[Soc.] And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire and power of attaining good?<br /><br />[Meno] Yes, I did say so.<br /><br />[Soc.] But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to all, and one man is no better than another in that respect?<br /><br />[Meno] True.<br /><br />[Soc.] And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he must be better in the power of attaining it?<br /><br />[Meno] Exactly.<br /><br />[Soc.] Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be the power of attaining good?<br /><br />[Meno] I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now view this matter.Max Weismannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02461338802201367403noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-48593321758362622922010-07-21T10:20:15.299-05:002010-07-21T10:20:15.299-05:00At one point, It seems that this discussion was le...At one point, It seems that this discussion was leading to a pluralistic view of "a good life," with a secular pursuit (i.e., not relying on any sacred scripture as an axiom) on one side and a religious conviction on the other. <br /><br />Can these two perspectives unite? <br /><br />Also, can a philosophical inquiry of a good life with truth of the matter as our goal lead to an understanding of its truth as it relates to religion?Kasaun E. Henryhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17463956009271665886noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-38309172989437849062010-07-15T07:15:13.484-05:002010-07-15T07:15:13.484-05:00>Agim, Yeah, I think Socrates was wrong.
This ...>Agim, Yeah, I think Socrates was wrong.<br /><br />This question is for Agim and anyone else who thinks Socrates was wrong, in saying that all persons, always do which they think/deem good and cannot do otherwise. If you have ever done anything in your life that you now regret having done, why did you do it?Max Weismannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02461338802201367403noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-16141108699041742642010-07-14T21:45:14.910-05:002010-07-14T21:45:14.910-05:00Agim,
>I think some men simply desire that tru...Agim,<br /><br />>I think some men simply desire that truth be what they wish it were.<br /><br />If these men desire truth to be what they wish it were, then they are in fact wishing to have the truth. In their case, they either don't want to do the work necessary to attain the truth or probably think the truth is what works for them. In either way, they want the truth or rather a truth from a relativist or pragmatic perspective.<br /><br />Thrasymachus, for example, while he mistakenly thinks that justice is in the interest of the stronger, he exhibits his desire to have an understanding of the way men treat each other--the truth. <br /><br />Therefore, the fact that he mistakes the counterfeit for the genuine truth, indicates that he wants the genuine truth.Kasaun E. Henryhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17463956009271665886noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-1798479027434305272010-07-14T19:23:45.288-05:002010-07-14T19:23:45.288-05:00Kausan:
You write: "I think I can say all m...Kausan:<br /><br />You write: "I think I can say all men desire to have truth."<br /><br />Well, you can certainly _say_ it but why on earth would you? There isn't really great evidence for the position. Certainly some men may want truth, maybe even most men, but I think some men simply desire that truth be what they wish it were.Agim Zabelihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03948402450866902015noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-52255513967751976752010-07-14T08:38:32.377-05:002010-07-14T08:38:32.377-05:00>Does anyone else here, think Socrates was wron...>Does anyone else here, think Socrates was wrong?<br /><br />I think Socrates was right, insofar that people ultimately do not desire to do anything harmful to their well-being or diminish their happiness.<br /><br />If that is not case, then Aristotle must be wrong in that "all men by nature desire to know." <br /><br />As I see it, to know is to have the truth. Therefore, I think I can say all men desire to have truth. If all men desire to have truth, then all men want to have truth about the chief good--happiness.<br /><br />However, man by nature is fallible and corruptible; that accounts for his mistakes. As for mistakes, I mean to say being misinformed, mistaking immediate gratification for a real good, hasty action, etc. This is why I agree with Socrates.Kasaun E. Henryhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17463956009271665886noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-27608501103582303272010-07-13T22:48:47.362-05:002010-07-13T22:48:47.362-05:00>I will send you the chapter, if you'd like...>I will send you the chapter, if you'd like.<br /><br />Yes, please, and thank you.<br /><br />>Does anyone else here, think Socrates was wrong?<br /><br />I do.Scott Straderhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14562160991460391754noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-4267952515531582992010-07-13T12:48:44.656-05:002010-07-13T12:48:44.656-05:00>I say it depends what we mean by a moral probl...>I say it depends what we mean by a moral problem. <br /><br />A vicious habit or inclination.<br /><br />>Frequently when we call something a moral problem, we mean that the person with the problem could overcome it if s/he were sufficiently resolute. Robert Hutchins once said ruefully, after hearing numerous speakers praising him at a testimonial dinner, that if he were such a great man he would have been able to give up smoking. But there is enormous empirical evidence (Hutchins himself being one of myriad examples) that this is NOT the case with substance abuse.<br /><br />Once addicted, I agree.<br /><br />>On the other hand, if morality is equated with Aristotle's notion of arete (virtue) as consisting in good habits, then to the extent that someone has developed habits that are not good, to that extent that person is not virtuous. And if we think the habit of substance abuse is not good, then a substance abuser to the extent of her/his substance abuse is not virtuous.<br /><br />Thank you.<br /><br />>with regard to whether we say lack of virtue is the problem or merely a symptom, what of it? What difference does it make?<br /><br />The important difference is what remedies are focused on and used to correct the problem, because usually, it seems, the symptom is addressed, whilst ignoring the cause.Max Weismannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02461338802201367403noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-38807287206004641842010-07-13T12:26:34.875-05:002010-07-13T12:26:34.875-05:00Aristotle identifies Socrates' error in Bk VII...Aristotle identifies Socrates' error in Bk VII of the Nicomachean Ethics when he takes up the question of how a man can fail in self-restraint when believing correctly - or knowing - that what he does is wrong. Aristotle's criticism hinges on a distinction between senses of 'knowing.' There is a passive sense of 'to know' which means being in possession of a certain science or knowledge without exercising it; the active sense, then is the active exercise of knowledge. For example, the geometer may possess the science of geometry without exercising that knowledge, such that the geometer may know that the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is equal to that of two right angles, but not recognize (yet) that the figure is a triangle.<br /><br />Later in ch 7, Aristotle presents the following:<br />"Again, reasoning on matters of conduct employs premises of two forms. Now it is quite possible for a man to act against knowledge when he knows both premises but is only exercising his knowledge of the universal premise and not of the particular; for action has to do with particular things. Moreover, there is a distinction as regards the universal term: one universal is predicated of the man himself, the other of the thing; for example, he may know and be conscious of the knowledge that dry food is good for every man and that he himself is a man, or even that food of a certain kind is dry, but either not possess or not be actualizing the knowledge whether the particular food before him is food of that kind. Now clearly the distinction between these two ways of knowing will make all the difference in the world. It will not seem at all strange that the unrestrained man should 'know' in one way, but it would be astonishing if he knew in another way" (Loeb Classical Library, Aristotle Vol. XIX p. 389, 1146b35-1147a9).Scott Straderhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14562160991460391754noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-75590776844396177582010-07-13T12:16:13.431-05:002010-07-13T12:16:13.431-05:00I hope Dan will forgive me if I offer a response t...I hope Dan will forgive me if I offer a response to Max's question to him before he (Dan) has done so.<br /><br />In response to Dan's question to Max about what he meant when he (Max) asked whether the lack of virtue is (a) the problem or (b) a symptom of a problem, Max replied,<br />"The most glaring example that has currency, is the so-called drug and alcohol abuse problem in our society. I posit that they are not problems, but a symptom of a moral problem, is that clear and do you agree?"<br /><br />I say it depends what we mean by a moral problem. Frequently when we call something a moral problem, we mean that the person with the problem could overcome it if s/he were sufficiently resolute. Robert Hutchins once said ruefully, after hearing numerous speakers praising him at a testimonial dinner, that if he were such a great man he would have been able to give up smoking. But there is enormous empirical evidence (Hutchins himself being one of myriad examples) that this is NOT the case with substance abuse. <br /><br />On the other hand, if morality is equated with Aristotle's notion of arete (virtue) as consisting in good habits, then to the extent that someone has developed habits that are not good, to that extent that person is not virtuous. And if we think the habit of substance abuse is not good, then a substance abuser to the extent of her/his substance abuse is not virtuous.<br /><br />My question back to Max is: with regard to whether we say lack of virtue is the problem or merely a symptom, what of it? What difference does it make?Jay Goldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08896550743748923730noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-74628101968427258712010-07-13T12:00:59.255-05:002010-07-13T12:00:59.255-05:00>believe Socrates is wrong on this matter, i.e....>believe Socrates is wrong on this matter, i.e., a person with knowledge of good and evil, will not, nay, cannot commit a vicious act.<br /><br />No, above I was reiterating what he said/meant.<br /><br />>But I interpret Socrates to be saying the same thing you are: that virtue is knowledge, and that nobody who knows the good ever deliberately does anything vicious.<br /><br />Yes, but he is very wrong, but it would be wonderful, if it were true.<br /><br />Here is what Adler says: Is there anyone who has not experienced remorse for having made a wrong choice or committed a wrong deed? How is it that we can know what is right and not choose it, or know what is wrong and still do it?<br /><br />The words used in the confession of sins are clear on this point. “We have done the things we ought not to have done, and we have failed to do what we ought to have done.” When Socrates said that knowledge is virtue, he asserted the opposite. Our knowing what is right necessitates our doing what is right. Therein lies the error made by Socrates.<br /><br />As I intimated earlier, Aristotle's analysis of incontinence in Book VII of his Ethics supplies us with the answer. We have two kinds of desire, not one: sensual desires and rational desires, desires of the intellectual appetite or will. They frequently come into conflict with one another, as most of us know from personal experience or from the vicarious experience of reading novels or seeing dramas in which the conflict between reason and the passions is central to the narrative or action.<br /><br />We make important choices many times in the course of our lives. They are always made at a particular time and place and under particular circumstances. The alternatives with which we are confronted simultaneously may be objects of sensual desire, on the one hand, and objects of rational desire, on the other hand.<br /><br />Intellectually knowing what is really good for us to choose, our intellectual appetite or will tends toward the objects of rational desire. Attributing apparent goodness to sensually attractive objects, our sensitive desires tend toward those objects.<br /><br />When the objects of rational desire are remote real goods-goods that cannot be obtained at the moment of choice-and the objects of sensitive desire are sensually present apparent goods, obtainable here and now, it is easy to give in to the temptations of immediately obtainable goods and hard to postpone the gratification of desire by choosing goods that are obtainable only in the long run.<br /><br />When persons make choices they later regret, or suffer remorse for choices they failed to make, what Aristotle called their incontinence consists in their refusal to defer gratification. He also tells us that the urge toward immediate gratification of desire is a typically childish indulgence in pleasures, meaning thereby not only the pleasures of the flesh, but also the pleasures that consist in being pleased when we get the things we want at the moment we want them.<br /><br />Acquiring moral virtue, forming the habit of right desire, is thus seen to be a process of conquering one's childish tendencies toward indulgence in immediate gratifications.<br /><br />This is not a complete account of all conflicts between reason and the passions. Objects of desire are not always pleasures of the flesh, or even objects that are immediately obtainable and pleasing in the sense that they satisfy our desires. Money, fame, and power are not objects of this sort. Nevertheless, they arouse passions which drive us to make wrong choices.<br /><br />The fourth book of Spinoza's Ethics is entitled “Of the passions or of human bondage.” The freedom we have lost when we are in bondage to the passions is the freedom of being able to will as we ought. That freedom is enjoyed only by persons of moral virtue. They have acquired that freedom by acquiring the habit of right choice, the habit of willing as one ought.Max Weismannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02461338802201367403noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-16007842453705692292010-07-13T11:53:16.625-05:002010-07-13T11:53:16.625-05:00Max,
I said I agreed with Socrates. You said you...Max,<br /><br />I said I agreed with Socrates. You said you<br /><br />>believe Socrates is wrong on this matter, i.e., a person with knowledge of good and evil, will not, nay, cannot commit a vicious act.<br /><br />But I interpret Socrates to be saying the same thing you are: that virtue is knowledge, and that nobody who knows the good ever deliberately does anything vicious.Jay Goldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08896550743748923730noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-59165156165971937852010-07-13T07:12:39.127-05:002010-07-13T07:12:39.127-05:00Agim: Yeah, I think Socrates was wrong.
Does any...Agim: Yeah, I think Socrates was wrong. <br /><br />Does anyone else here, think Socrates was wrong?Max Weismannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02461338802201367403noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-55928247779770574352010-07-13T06:32:18.889-05:002010-07-13T06:32:18.889-05:00>Thanks, Max. I'll have to run that work do...>Thanks, Max. I'll have to run that work down. Any chance you could summarize the argument - or is that a polite way of saying I'm straying beyond the bounds of the issue at hand?<br /><br />Not at all and I will send you the chapter, if you'd like.Max Weismannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02461338802201367403noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-29140563080117927312010-07-12T23:01:19.472-05:002010-07-12T23:01:19.472-05:00>This subject is well addressed in Adler's ...>This subject is well addressed in Adler's book Intellect-Mind Over Matter, chapter 14 Appetitive Power and Its Acts: Willing and Choosing.<br /><br />Thanks, Max. I'll have to run that work down. Any chance you could summarize the argument - or is that a polite way of saying I'm straying beyond the bounds of the issue at hand?Scott Straderhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14562160991460391754noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-5314813615112826212010-07-12T22:54:58.878-05:002010-07-12T22:54:58.878-05:00>Can you help me out and clarify your question ...>Can you help me out and clarify your question for me a bit?<br /><br />I'll try, Agim. You're original comment seems to be reducible to a hypothetical necessity: You can do the right thing (lead a truly good life) if and only if you fear the Lord. <br /><br />This is the position of many Christians, and may be right after all, but most Christians also hold the doctrine of sufficient grace, which states that each person is given sufficient grace to recognize the truth of Christianity. And further, if a person fails to recognize this truth as such, this failure is due to a bad will. If my understanding of this doctrine is sound, I think "bad will" here simply means a stubbornness or pridefulness (perhaps sinfulness in a generic sense) which prevents one from embracing the truth of Christianity. Since this doctrine of sufficient grace and its implications is a commonly held position in Christian circles, I was wondering if you held this position or something else. <br /><br />I think this is a fascinating issue in itself, but I think this discussion could help illuminate the matter at hand regarding how the will relates to the attainment of the good life.Scott Straderhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14562160991460391754noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-14995676215421658662010-07-12T22:16:57.112-05:002010-07-12T22:16:57.112-05:00Max:
In all the excitement of the disagreements w...Max:<br /><br />In all the excitement of the disagreements we weren't having I somehow missed your earlier question to me. You wrote:<br /><br /> "...Socrates observes that no man desires evil--that which in fact he deems injurious, harmful, or disadvantageous to himself and, conversely, that everyone desires that which in fact he deems beneficial, advantageous, or good for himself. Do you think Socrates wrong about this?"<br /><br />Yeah, I think Socrates was wrong. As pointed out by that rock-star philosopher, Michael Caine as the butler Alfred in Batman - The Dark Knight: "Some men just want to see the world burn."<br /><br />Destructive and self-destructive behavior is far too common to be ignored in a discussion of how people behave.Agim Zabelihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03948402450866902015noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-80467982575789132482010-07-12T21:52:23.388-05:002010-07-12T21:52:23.388-05:00Max:
Aw, come on! The etymology of "metaphy...Max:<br /><br />Aw, come on! The etymology of "metaphysics"? Seriously? Okay. You win. I'll never mention religion again.<br /><br />Until necessary.Agim Zabelihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03948402450866902015noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-51219690775373267542010-07-12T21:13:05.417-05:002010-07-12T21:13:05.417-05:00“Metaphysics” is a word that Aristotle's edito...“Metaphysics” is a word that Aristotle's editors invented to name books he wrote that came after his books on physics. Today we would call it philosophical theology, which is welcomed here.Max Weismannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02461338802201367403noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-83081885859520694302010-07-12T21:03:32.232-05:002010-07-12T21:03:32.232-05:00Max:
You write: "We have not disagreed on a...Max:<br /><br />You write: "We have not disagreed on anything, I merely do not want to bring theology/religion into the discussion."<br /><br />I disagree that we are not disagreeing. I am asserting that one cannot adequately discuss "a really good life", a subject that inherently includes concepts such as morals, virtue, "right" conduct, prudence, and even sin (or evil) and at the same time demand that religion be left out of the discussion. It would be like having a pasta-making discussion where no one was allowed to mention boiling water.<br /><br />I no longer have as nice a straw hat as you do - I left mine in India - but that doesn't mean I have to defer to your judgement about whether we're disagreeing.<br /><br />On the main point - no religion allowed - if that's your rule I'll live with it. I do think however it is ill-advised. How does one discuss the metaphysical if we have to leave out the "meta"?Agim Zabelihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03948402450866902015noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-4969409212962850692010-07-12T20:46:03.734-05:002010-07-12T20:46:03.734-05:00Agim's post prompts me to say, Mortimer Adler ...Agim's post prompts me to say, Mortimer Adler and I have restricted our discussions of the problems of the good life and the good society (moral philosophy) to the temporal life and to that life on its secular plane. Those among you who are religious persons and distinguish between the secular and the religious activities they engage in, as well as between their worldly and their religious aspirations, will be able to affix appropriate qualifications, additions, and even dissents to various things we will say "without regard to religion." Those who are not religious persons or who make no distinctions between the secular and the religious life will, of course, not be aware of any need for such qualifications, additions, or dissents.Max Weismannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02461338802201367403noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-16484908337776140682010-07-12T20:40:09.044-05:002010-07-12T20:40:09.044-05:00Agim,
We have not disagreed on anything, I merely...Agim,<br /><br />We have not disagreed on anything, I merely do not want to bring theology/religion into the discussion.Max Weismannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02461338802201367403noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-65645892392194606602010-07-12T20:34:41.967-05:002010-07-12T20:34:41.967-05:00All:
Max and I are currently disagreeing about th...All:<br /><br />Max and I are currently disagreeing about this same question at my blog, Two Masters, at: <br /><br />http://two-masters.blogspot.com/2010/07/in-post-below-max-weismann-asked-what.html<br /><br />If anyone wants to join the religion/no religion discussion, I think you'll have to cut-and-paste the address above.<br /><br />(Max: Not trying to steal business from the Center. Just figure if the theological thread's already started over there...)Agim Zabelihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03948402450866902015noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-39584202392485618532010-07-12T19:00:25.341-05:002010-07-12T19:00:25.341-05:00But the question as I see it is, from a natural st...But the question as I see it is, from a natural standpoint, what distinguishes a bad will from the good will? For instance, is a natural inclination to some form of Idealism the product of a good will, while the natural inclination toward nihilism the product of a bad will?<br /><br />Scott,<br /><br />This subject is well addressed in Adler's book Intellect-Mind Over Matter, chapter 14 Appetitive Power and Its Acts: Willing and Choosing.Max Weismannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02461338802201367403noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7011275266856476274.post-18157186493900411022010-07-12T18:56:57.290-05:002010-07-12T18:56:57.290-05:00Scott:
You write: "Do you hold that the fai...Scott:<br /><br />You write: "Do you hold that the failure of one to recognize the truth of the Christian faith is due to a bad will on the part of the skeptic? If so, why? If not, why not?"<br /><br />I'm not sure I even really understand your question. On one theological hand, God "chooses" whom to save (you know, "grace alone" and all that). On the other hand, we're all sinners and we're gonna burn UNLESS God saves us. If you are using "bad will" synonymously with "sinfulness", I suppose the answer would be "yes" but even then we may be talking around each other somewhat.<br /><br />Can you help me out and clarify your question for me a bit?Agim Zabelihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03948402450866902015noreply@blogger.com